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STRATEGIC POWER REVISITED
Abstract
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction.
Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is
unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable
information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach
to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is
developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes
players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative
games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking
expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then
defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be
special cases.
JEL Classification: C70, D70, D72.
Keywords: power indices, spatial voting, equilibrium analysis, decision
procedures.
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Scientists who study decision power in political and economic institutions are divided into
two disjoint methodological camps. The ﬁrst one uses non-cooperative game theory to anal-
yse the impact of explicit decision procedures and given preferences over a well-deﬁned –
usually Euclidean – policy space.1 The second one stands in the tradition of cooperative
game theory with much more abstractly deﬁned voting bodies: The considered agents a
priori have no preferences and form winning coalitions which a posteriori implement un-
speciﬁed policies. Individual chances of being part of and inﬂuencing a winning coalition
are then measured by a power index.2
Proponents of either approach have recently intensiﬁed their debate.3 The non-cooperative
camp’s verdict is that “power indices exclude variables that ought to be in a political anal-
ysis (institutions and strategies) and include variables that ought to be left out (compu-
tational formulas and hidden assumptions)” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999a, p. 337). The
cooperative camp has responded by clarifying the supposedly hidden assumptions un-
derlying power formulas and giving reasons for not making institutions and strategies –
corresponding to decision procedures and rational, preference-driven agents – explicit.4
Several authors, including ourselves, have concluded that it is time to develop a uniﬁed
framework for measuring decision power (cf. Steunenberg et al., 1999, and Felsenthal and
Machover, 2001a).5 On the one hand, such a framework should allow for predictions and
1See e.g. Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994, 1996), Crombez (1996, 1998), Moser (1996, 1997).
2See e.g. Brams and Aﬀuso (1985a, 1985b), Widgr´ en (1994), Hosli (1993), Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998),
Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001), Felsenthal and Machover (2001b), Leech (2002) for applications of traditional
power indices to EU decision making. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Nurmi (1998) contain a more
general discussion regarding the cooperative analysis of the EU.
3Cf. the contributions to the symposium in Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 1999, together with
Tsebelis and Garrett (1997), Garrett and Tsebelis (2001), and Felsenthal and Machover (2001a).
4See, in particular, Holler and Widgr´ en (1999), Berg and Lane (1999), and Felsenthal and Machover
(2001a).
5Gul (1989) and Hart and MasColell (1996) give non-cooperative foundations for the Shapley value and
thus the prominent Shapley-Shubik index.
1a posteriori analysis of decisions based on knowledge of procedures and preferences. On
the other hand, it must be open to a priori analysis when detailed information is either
not available or should be ignored for normative reasons. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst attempt
to provide such a framework (Steunenberg et al., 1999) is problematic. It confuses cause
and eﬀect, confounding power and the success that may, but need not, result from it. This
paper reviews their attempt and proposes an alternative framework.
In particular, we generalize the concept of a player’s marginal impact or marginal
contribution to a collective decision in order to establish a common (a posteriori) primitive
of power for cooperative and non-cooperative analysis. Its evaluation amounts to the
comparison of an actual outcome with a shadow outcome which alternatively could have
been brought about by the considered player. In our view, this goes a long way towards
a reconciliation of equilibrium-based non-cooperative measurement and winning coalition-
based traditional power indices. Namely, one can transparently measure a priori power
as a player’s expected a posteriori power or marginal impact. This is in line with the
probabilistic interpretation of traditional power indices (cf. Owen 1972, 1995 and Straﬃn,
1988). Expectation is to be taken with respect to an appropriate probability measure on the
power-relevant states of the world. The framework is ﬂexible and allows for diﬀerent degrees
of a priori-ness, concerning players’ either preference-based or purely random actions as
well as decision procedures. Traditional a priori power indices, such as the Penrose index
or Shapley-Shubik index, can be obtained as special cases.
The cooperative or index approach to power analysis has evolved signiﬁcantly in the
last 50 years. It has reached a point where its integration into a framework that also allows
for explicit decision procedures and preference-driven agent behavior is but a natural step.
To demonstrate this we ﬁrst give a short overview of the index approach in section 2. The
fundamental critique by Garrett and Tsebelis and the creative response by Steunenberg et
al. are sketched in sections 3 and 4. The main section 5 then lays out our uniﬁed framework
and section 6 concludes.
22 The Traditional Power Index Approach
The traditional object of studies of decision power has been a weighted voting game char-
acterized by a set of players, N = f1;:::;ng, a voting weight for each player, wi ¸ 0
(i 2 N), and a minimal quota of weights, k > 0. Subsets of players, S µ N, are called
coalitions, and if a coalition S meets the quota, i.e.
P
i2S wi ¸ k, it is a winning coalition.
Formation of a winning coalition is assumed to be desirable to its members, e.g. because
they can jointly pass policy proposals that are in their interest. More generally, a winning
coalition need not be determined by voting weights. One can conveniently describe an ab-
stract decision body v by directly stating either the set W(v) of all its winning coalitions
or its subset of minimal winning coalitions, M(v).6 The latter contains only those winning
coalitions which are turned into a losing coalition by the exit of any of its members. An
equivalent representation is obtained by taking v to be a mapping from the set of all pos-
sible coalitions, }(N), to f0;1g, where v(S) = 0 (1) indicates that S is winning (losing).
Function v is usually referred to as a simple game. The diﬀerence v(S) ¡ v(S ¡ fig) is
known as player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S.
The most direct approach to measuring players’ power is to state a mapping ¹ – called
an index – from the space of simple games to Rn
+ together with a verbal story of why ¹i(v)
indicates player i’s power in the considered class of decision bodies. The main drawback
of this approach is that despite the plausibility of some “stories”, their verbal form easily
disguises incoherence or even inconsistency.
The axiomatic or property-based approach, in contrast, explicitly states a set of math-
ematical properties fA1;:::;Akg that an index is supposed to have – together with an
(in the ideal case: unique) index ¹ which actually satisﬁes them. The requirements Aj
are usually referred to as axioms, unwarrantedly suggesting their general acceptance. A
prominent example for the axiomatic approach to power indices is the Shapley-Shubik
index Á (cf. Shapley, 1953, and Shapley and Shubik, 1954). Though this may not be im-
6Typically, one requires that the empty set is losing, the grand coalition N is winning, and any set
containing a winning coalition is also winning.
3mediately obvious, four properties A1–A4 imply that Ái(v) must be player i’s weighted
marginal contribution to all coalitions S, where weights are proportional to the number
of player orderings (j1;:::;i;:::;jn) such that S = fj1;:::;ig.7 Axioms can give a clear
reason of why Á and no other mapping is used – in particular, if a convincing story for
them is provided. A main drawback of the axiomatic approach is, however, that axioms
usually clarify the tool with which one measures,8 but not what is measured based on
which (behavioural and institutional) assumptions about players and the decision body.
In contrast, the probabilistic approach to the construction of power indices entails ex-
plicit assumptions about agents’ behaviour together with an explicit deﬁnition of what is
measured. Agent behaviour is speciﬁed as a probability distribution P for players’ accep-
tance rates, denoting the probabilities of a ‘yes’-vote by individual players. A given player’s
a priori power is then taken to be his probability of casting a decisive vote, i.e. to pass
a proposal that would not have passed had he voted ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’. Thus power is
inferred from the hypothetical consequences of an agent’s behaviour.
The object of analysis is with this approach no longer described only by the set of
winning coalitions or the mapping v, but also an explicit model of (average) behaviour.
For example, the widely applied Penrose index (Penrose, 1947) – also know as the non-
normalized Banzhaf index – is based on the distribution assumption that each player inde-
pendently votes ‘yes’ with probability 1/2 (on an unspeciﬁed proposal). The corresponding
joint distribution of acceptance rates then deﬁnes the index ¯ where ¯i(v) turns out to be,
again, player i’s weighted marginal contribution to all coalitions in v, where weight is this
7The Shapley-Shubik index is uniquely characterized by the requirements that a (dummy) player who
makes no marginal contribution in v has index value 0 (A1: dummy player axiom), that the labelling of
the players does not matter (A2: anonymity axiom), that players’ index values add up to 1 (A3: eﬃciency
axiom), and that in the composition u _ v of two simple games u and v, having the union of W(v) and
W(v) as its set of winning coalitions W(u _ v), each player’s power equals the sum of his power in u and
his power in v minus his power in the game u^v obtained by intersecting W(v) and W(u) (A4: additivity
axiom).
8Even this cannot be taken for granted. Axioms can be too general or mathematically complex to give
much insight.
4time equal to 1=2n¡1 for every coalition S µ N.9
The Penrose index allows for important conclusions related to the design of political
institutions. For example, it can be derived that in order to give every citizen of the EU
the same a priori chance to (indirectly) cast the decisive vote on Council decisions, weights
in the Council have to be such that each member state’s index value is proportional to the
square root of its population size.10
Where the direct approach and the axiomatic approach required “stories” to justify
the index ¹ itself and the set of axioms fA1;:::;Akg, respectively, the assumption of a
particular distribution P of acceptance rates has to be motivated. This points towards the
drawbacks of the probabilistic index approach. First, the described behaviour is usually
not connected to any information on agent preferences or decision procedures.11 Second,
decisions by individual players are assumed to be stochastically independent. This will, in
practice, only rarely be the case since it is incompatible with negotiated coalition formation
and voting on issues based on stable player preferences.
3 The Critique by Garrett and Tsebelis
Probabilistically deﬁned power indices are a ﬂexible tool. Imposing stochastic or determin-
istic restrictions for coalitions containing particular players or sub-coalitions can alleviate
several shortcomings of traditional indices (see van den Brink, 2001, or Napel and Widgr´ en,
2001). This does not impress the critics of traditional power indices. Concerning appli-
cations to decision making in the European Union (EU), Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a,
1999b, and 2001) have taken a particularly critical stance, pointing out indices’ ignorance
9This means that ¯i(v) is the ratio of the number of swings that player i does have to the number of
swings that i could have. Alternatively, one can also derive ¯ from the assumption that players’ acceptance
rates are independently uniformly distributed on [0;1].
10Weights do, in fact, approximately respect this rule – except for the biggest and smallest member
states, Germany and Luxemburg.
11If such information is not available, the principle of insuﬃcient reason seems a valid argument for the
assumptions behind the Penrose index.
5of decision procedures and player strategies.
It is not our purpose to contribute much to the ongoing debate sparked by their critique
itself (see Berg and Lane, 1999, Holler and Widgr´ en, 1999, Steunenberg, Schmidtchen, and
Koboldt, 1999, and Felsenthal and Machover, 2001a). Let it suﬃce to state that, ﬁrst, we
agree that institutions and strategies have to be taken into account by political analysis.
Second, in our view both the normative or constitutional a priori analysis of political
institutions and the positive or practical political analysis of actual and expected decisions
are valuable.
There is a fundamental diﬀerence between giving normative reasons for or against
particular voting weights, veto rules, etc. in European decision making on the one hand,
and providing decision support e.g. to Mrs Thatcher during negotiations of the Single
European Act on the other hand.
It is a legitimate question to ask: Which voting weights in the Council would be equi-
table? For an answer, countries’ special interests and their potentially unstable preferences
in diﬀerent policy dimensions should not matter. Hence they are best concealed behind a
‘veil of ignorance’ – as it is done by the Penrose index. Another case for the purely prob-
abilistic assumptions of traditional index analysis is e.g. the study of the susceptibility of
multi-stage indirect decision procedures to the ‘Bush eﬀect’, i.e. one candidate’s indirect
election despite a nation-wide majority for a competitor. Minimization of the probabil-
ity that upper-level decisions are taken against a majority at a lower level should not be
conditioned to any reality-informed preference assumptions.
However, evaluation of the medium-run expected inﬂuence on EU policy from a particu-
lar country’s point of view will be more accurate if available preference information is taken
into account.12 Garrett and Tsebelis’s goal of “understanding ...policy changes on speciﬁc
issues ...and negotiations about treaty revisions” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999b, p. 332)
12The ‘medium run’ can, however, be short-lived: A social democratic Council member can quickly turn
into a right-wing conservative through elections. News about the ﬁrst national or another foreign outbreak
of mad-cow disease can quickly change voters’ and a government’s views on agricultural, health, or trade
policy.
6or, in general, “understanding decision-making in the EU” (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001,
p. 105) seems impossible to achieve by looking only at the voting weights of diﬀerent EU
members and the relevant qualiﬁed majority rule. The traditional power index approaches
outlined in section 2 are not the right framework to discuss these positive questions related
to power.
We disagree with Garrett and Tsebelis’ (2001) call for “a moratorium on the prolifera-
tion of index-based studies” (p. 100) and take seriously what they dismiss as “the mantra of
index scholars about the importance of ‘a prioristic constitutional considerations’” (p. 103).
As has already been pointed out by Felsenthal and Machover, it is a matter of taste whether
one deems the pursuit of positive or normative analysis more worthwhile. We believe in
both and agree with Garrett and Tsebelis that the strategic implications, which are hard
to separate from players’ preferences, of particular institutional arrangements in the EU
and elsewhere have received too little attention. We think it desirable to have a general
uniﬁed framework which allows for positive and normative analysis, actual political and
constitutional investigations.
4 The Strategic Power Index of Steunenberg et al.
Replying to the critique by Garrett and Tsebelis, Steunenberg et al. have proposed what
they believe to be a framework which could reconcile traditional power index analysis and
non-cooperative analysis of games which explicitly describe agents’ choices in a political
procedure and (their beliefs about) agents’ preferences. Steunenberg et al.’s starting point
is Barry’s (1980) distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’. Namely, a player who is particu-
larly satisﬁed by the equilibrium outcome of a game – interpreted as success in the game –
need not be powerful. Steunenberg et al. strive to isolate “the ability of a player to make
a diﬀerence in the outcome” (p. 362).
They consider a spatial voting model with n players and an m-dimensional outcome
space. In our notation, let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of players and X µ Rm be the
outcome or policy space. Γ denotes the procedure or game form describing the decision-
7making process and q 2 X describes the status quo before the start of decision-making.
Players are assumed to have Euclidean preferences where ¸i 2 X (i 2 N) is player i’s
ideal point. A particular combination of all players’ ideal points and the status quo point
deﬁnes a ‘state of the world’ ». Assuming that it exists and is unique, let x¤(») denote
the equilibrium outcome of the game based on Γ and ».13 Steunenberg et al. note that
“[h]aving a preference that lies close to the equilibrium outcome of a particular game does
not necessarily mean that this player is also ‘powerful’” (p. 345). Therefore, they suggest
to consider not one particular state of the world but many.
In particular, one can consider each ¸i and the status quo q to be realizations of
random variables ˜ ¸i and ˜ q, respectively. If P denotes the joint distribution of random











gives the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome for decision procedure Γ and
player i’s ideal outcome (k¢k denotes the Euclidean norm). Steunenberg et al. believe that
“all other things being equal, a player is more powerful than another player if the expected
distance between the equilibrium outcome and its ideal point is smaller than the expected
distance for the other player” (p. 348). In order to obtain not only a ranking of players
but a meaningful measure of their power, they proceed by considering a dummy player d
– either already one of the players or added to N – “whose preferences vary over the same
range as the preferences of actual players.” This leads to their deﬁnition of the strategic










The remainder of Steunenberg et al.’s paper is then dedicated to the detailed investiga-
tion of particular game forms Γ which model the consultation and cooperation procedures
of EU decision making. They derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the respective
policy game for any state of the world », and aggregate the distance between players’ ideal
13Non-uniqueness may be accounted for by either equilibrium selection criteria or, in a priori analysis,
explicit assumptions about diﬀerent equilibria’s probability.
8outcome and the equilibrium outcome assuming independent uniform distributions over a
one-dimensional state space X for the ideal points and the status quo. The uniformity
assumption is not as innocuous at it may seem. It is sensitive to the chosen mapping of
reality to states, i.e. one’s choice of X. Garrett and Tsebelis (2001, p. 101) claim that “the
costs [of this simplifying assumption] are very high when we know ::: that some Council
members tend to hold extreme views (such as the UK) whereas others are generally more
centrally located (such as Germany).” However, the calculations could quite easily be re-
done with a more complex distribution assumption. The more important questions are: Is
ΨΓ
i informative? Does it measure what it is claimed to do?
The answer to the second question is no. In particular, (1) deﬁnes ∆Γ
i to be player i’s
expected success. Just like actual distance measures success (a function of luck and power),
so does average distance measure average success. Unless one regards average success as the
deﬁning characteristic of power, considering expectations will only by coincidence achieve
what Steunenberg et al. aim at, namely to “level out the eﬀect of ‘luck’ or a particular
preference conﬁguration on the outcome of a game” (p. 362).
As a ﬁrst example, consider three agents and outcome space X = f¡1;0;1g. Assume
that voter 1’s random ideal point, ˜ ¸1, is degenerate and always equal to 0, while ˜ ¸i is
uniformly distributed on X for i 2 f2;3g.14 The status quo is always ˜ q = 0. Let the
procedure consist of pair-wise simple majority decisions between all alternatives, and then
a ﬁnal vote against the status quo. For example, let players start with a vote between -1
and 0, then there is a vote between the winning alternative and 1, and ﬁnally they vote
between the winning alternative of the last stage and q = 0. Suppose that each player
has equal voting weight. Then there are only two out of nine states of the world in which
the status quo does not prevail (namely, ˜ » = (˜ q; ˜ ¸1; ˜ ¸2; ˜ ¸3)with ˜ q = 0, ˜ ¸1 = 0, and either
˜ ¸2 = ˜ ¸3 = ¡1 or ˜ ¸2 = ˜ ¸3 = 1). Average distance from the equilibrium outcome is 2=9 for
player 1 but 4=9 for players 2 and 3, i.e. player 1 turns out to be the most successful and,
14The point is not that ˜ ¸1 is a constant, but that its distribution is more concentrated around the mean
of X than those of ˜ ¸i (i 6= 1). Alternatively, choose e.g. uniform distribution on [0,1] for all ˜ ¸i with i 6= 1
and Beta-distribution with parameters (n + 1)=2 and (n + 1)=2 for ˜ ¸1.
9according to the StPI, most powerful. This may match the intuition that centrist players
are more powerful under simple majority rule than players with (sometimes) more extreme
positions. However, exactly the same equilibrium outcomes prevail when player 1’s voting
weight is reduced to zero, i.e. if he becomes a dummy player.15 According to Steunenberg
et al.’s Strict Power Index, he is still the most powerful player.
To give a second, less theoretical example, consider a group of four boys. The oldest
one is the leader and makes proposals of what to do in the afternoon (play football, watch
a movie, etc.) which have to be accepted by simple majority of the remaining three. Given
a particular state of the world – determined by weather, the boys’ physical condition,
pocket money, etc. – some group member will more enjoy their afternoon programme than
another. As Steunenberg et al. would acknowledge, the former boy is more lucky, not more
powerful than the latter. Assume that all boys’ preferences have the same distribution, but
that they are independent of each other (for simplicity, let them draw unrelated conclusions
about the desirability of football when it is raining). As the agenda setter, the oldest boy
will have smaller average distance to the equilibrium outcome than the others. Amongst
the latter, expected distance and hence their StPI value is the same. Now, enter the little
brother of the group’s leader. He is not given a say in selecting the daily programme but
– generously – allowed to participate. It is plausible to assume that he does not always
agree with his elder brother’s most desired outcome, but does so more often than with the
others’ ideal alternatives. Mathematically speaking, let the ideal points of the two brothers
be positively correlated. Then, the mean distance between the group’s equilibrium activity
and its youngest member’s most desired recreation will be smaller than that of those group
members who actually have their vote on the outcome.
For a ﬁnal, real-world example note that the European Economic Community’s Treaty
of Rome gave Luxemburg insuﬃcient voting weight to ever be decisive.16 Sharing very
15For an even number of players, let the status quo win unless defeated by a majority.
16This was changed in 1973, when the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC. The relative voting
weight of Luxemburg was decreased but it became more powerful when measured by traditional power
indices (Brams & Aﬀuso 1985a, 1985b).
10similar views with the other two Benelux countries it, in fact, did not need power to
be a successful EU member. Therefore, the StPI would have indicated great power of
Luxemburg despite its formal impotence.
There are other points worth making about the analytical framework of Steunenberg et
al. In particular, their deﬁnition of a dummy player is not always meaningful. For them, a
dummy player is “a player whose preferences vary over the same range as the preferences
of the actual players, but that has no decision-making rights in the game” (p. 348). What
does it mean to “vary over the same range” if the so-called actual players’ ideal points (to
stay in a spatial voting framework) have diﬀerent supports, e.g. ˜ ¸i is uniformly distributed
on [0;1] and ˜ ¸j has triangular distribution on [1=2;4]?
Or, suppose that the marginal distribution of ˜ ¸i calculated from the joint distribution
of ˜ » is uniform on [0;1] for every i 2 N. The natural assumption for dummy player d’s
random ideal point ˜ ¸d then is a uniform distribution on [0;1]. But what if player 1 to n’s
ideal points are dependent, in particular assume that ˜ ¸1 = ::: = ˜ ¸n¡1 and ˜ ¸n = 1 ¡ ˜ ¸n¡1.
The equilibrium outcome will be biased against player n’s preferences under almost every
decision procedure Γ. If, in particular, we have pair-wise simple or qualiﬁed majority voting
between all alternatives, the equilibrium outcome is x¤(») = ¸n¡1 = 1 ¡ ¸n. So expected
distance ∆Γ
i is zero for i = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 and ∆Γ
n = 1=2. In contrast, dummy player d with
an independently uniformly distributed ideal point has ∆Γ
d = 1=3. Contrary to a remark
by Steunenberg et al. (p. 349, fn. 7), equilibrium outcomes can be systematically biased
against the interest of a particular player. Therefore, the StPI can become negative – in
this example ΨΓ
n = ¡1=2. For a measure of average normalized success this makes sense. It
simply indicates that player n, always having a position ‘opposite’ of his n ¡ 1 colleagues,
is less successful on average than a neutral member of the decision body would be.
The StPI is not an irrelevant concept for the analysis of decision bodies. It takes into
account strategic interaction in possibly complicated procedures. It is a meaningful and,
in our view, informative measure of expected success, which is important in both economic
and political institutions. But Steunenberg et al.’s framework leads to a strategic success
index, not a strategic power index.
11It is slightly surprising that Felsenthal and Machover regard the StPI as “a natural gen-
eralization of a priori I-power” (p. 95). I-power, in the context of traditional (non-spatial)
weighted voting games, refers to a player’s inﬂuence or “ability to aﬀect the outcome of a
division of a voting body – whether the bill in question will be passed or defeated” (p. 84).
We have diﬃculties to see how the StPI is related to a player’s inﬂuence in the above
examples.
Felsenthal and Machover regard the StPI as a “promising” and “interesting instance of
a uniﬁed method” which superimposes information on aﬃnities, preferences, and a priori
power (pp. 91 and 96). Their case in point is that for perfectly symmetric state space X
and independent uniform distributions of ideal points, the StPI is just a re-scaling of the
Penrose index. One is tempted to conclude that by taking strategic interaction and players’
preferences explicitly into account, Steunenberg et al. have discovered a complicated detour
to where a short-cut has existed for so long.
However, it is known that a success measure can, in some cases, work like a re-scaled
Penrose index. The Rae index r (1969) measures players’ success or satisfaction in the
sense that it gives the probability of voting ‘yes’ when a proposal passes and ‘no’ when a
proposal is rejected.17 It thus measures how often a group decision corresponds with an
individual’s preferences, i.e. what is the expexted distance between the outcome and an
individual’s ideal point on a simple X = f0;1g policy space. The relationship between the








The StPI measures something reminiscent to ri in a general spatial context. This makes
Felsenthal and Machover’s observation less surprising.19
17See also Straﬃn et al. (1982) who distinguish between ‘eﬀect on outcome’ and ‘eﬀect on group-
individual agreement.’ The former is measured by power indices while the latter is measured by satisfaction
indices like r.
18See Rae (1969) for details.
19Note that the relationship between the Shapley-Shubik index and the corresponding satisfaction index
is more complicated (see Straﬃn, 1978, for details).
12Moreover, Felsenthal and Machover’s a prioristic version of the StPI departs signiﬁ-
cantly from Steunenberg et al.’s own approach – to the extent that it ignores the contri-
bution the latter have made. Steunenberg et al. derive a measure which takes strategic
interaction into account and is therefore suited for the analysis of procedural decision
making. When Felsenthal and Machover take Steunenberg et al.’s model behind a veil of
ignorance, they replace the equilibrium proposal – formally the random variable x¤(˜ ») –
by a random proposal ˜ x which is independent of the random vector of players’ ideal points
˜ ¸ = (˜ ¸1;:::; ˜ ¸n). Thus all strategic interaction and the procedural constraints, which make
for a complicated dependence of x¤(˜ ») and ˜ ¸, are dropped. The StPI loses its ‘St’, and
one is back to Garrett and Tsebelis’s observation (Garrett and Tsebelis, 2001, p. 101):
“Making a proposal (i.e. agenda-setting in game-theoretic terms) has nothing to do with
the probabilities calculated in power indices.”
5 An alternative approach
Steunenberg et al.’s framework is suited to study success both a posteriori and, by taking
expectations, a priori. The chief reason why the StPI does not measure power is its reliance
on information only about the outcome of strategic interaction. Power is about potential
and thus refers to consequences of both actual and hypothetical actions. It means the
ability to make a – subjectively valuable – diﬀerence to something. The key to isolating
a player’s power in the context of collective decision making is his marginal impact or
his marginal contribution to the outcome x¤. As mentioned in section 2, this concept is
well-established in the context of simple games and also general cooperative games, where
it measures the implication of some player i entering a coalition S. The fundamental idea
of comparing a given outcome with one or several other outcomes, taking the considered
player’s behaviour to be variable, can be generalized to a non-cooperative setting which
explicitly describes a decision procedure.
135.1 An Example
For illustration, consider the player set N[fbg, the rather restricted policy space X = f0;1g
embedded in R, and status quo ˜ q = 0. Let the decision procedure Γ be such that, ﬁrst,
bureaucrat b sets the agenda, i.e. either proposes 1 or ends the game and thereby conﬁrms
the status quo. Formally, he chooses an action ab from Ab = f1;qg. If a proposal is
made, then all players i 2 N simultaneously vote either ‘yes’, denoted by ai = 1, or ‘no’
(ai = 0). This makes Ai = f0;1g their respective set of actions. The proposal is accepted
if the weighted number of ‘yes’-votes meets a ﬁxed quota k, where the vote by player i is
weighted by wi ¸ 0. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. Formally, the function









maps all action proﬁles a = (ab;a1;:::;an) to an outcome. Traditional power index analysis
for players i 2 N can easily be mimicked with this setting: Take
D
0
i(a) := x(ab;a1;:::;ai;:::;an) ¡ x(ab;a1;:::;0;:::;an) (2)
as player i’s marginal contribution for action proﬁle a – corresponding to v(S)¡v(S nfig)
for coalition S = fjjaj = 1g – and make probabilistic assumptions over the set of all action
proﬁles. The latter replaces the probability distribution over the set of all coalitions which
is usually considered (via assumptions on acceptance rates). Assume, for example, that











corresponds exactly to the traditional probabilistic measures obtained via Owen’s multi-





1=2n¡1; ab = 1
0; ab = 0;











; ab = 1
0; ab = 0;
it is the Shapley-Shubik index.
Economic and political actions are in modern theoretical analysis regarded to be the
consequence of rational and strategic reasoning based on explicit preferences. So directly
considering (probability distributions over) players’ action choices without recurring to
the underlying preferences is methodologically somewhat unsatisfying.20 But it is usually
not diﬃcult to ﬁnd (probability distributions over) preferences which rationalize given
behaviour. In above example, one may e.g. assume that players i 2 N have random
spatial and procedural preferences with uniformly distributed ideal points ˜ ¸i taking values
in X and the procedural component that for given policy outcome x 2 X they prefer to
have voted truthfully.21 Let the bureaucrat have only a procedural preference, namely one
for putting up a proposal if and only if it is accepted.
Now consider a particular realization of ideal points ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸n). In the unique
equilibrium of this game, ﬁrst, the bureaucrat chooses ab = 1, i.e. he proposes 1, if and
only if the set Y := fij¸i = 1g meets the quota, i.e.
P
i2Y wi ¸ k. Second, every voter













maps all preference proﬁles (as determined by the vector of players’ ideal points) to a
unique equilibrium outcome. Assumptions about the distribution P 0 of random vector ˜ ¸ =
20It is a very convenient short-cut, however. Also note that models of boundedly rational agents who
do not optimize but apply heuristic rules of thumb receive more and more attention in the game-theoretic
literature (see e.g. Samuelson, 1997, Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, and Young, 1998).
21See Hanson (1996) on the importance of procedural preferences in the context of collective decision
making. Our procedural preference assumption can e.g. be motivated by regarding each player as the
representative of a constituency to which he wants do demonstrate his active pursuit of its interests.
15(˜ ¸1;:::; ˜ ¸n) can be stated such that P 0 induces the same distribution P over action proﬁles a
in equilibrium which has been directly assumed above. For example, P 0(¸1;:::;¸n) ´
1=2n¡1 implies equilibrium behaviour which lets ¹Γ
i in (3) equal the Penrose index.
5.2 Measuring A Posteriori Power
We propose to extend above analysis from the simple coalition framework of a priori power
measurement and the very basic voting game just considered to a more general framework.
First, take a player’s marginal contribution as the best available indicator of his potential
or ability to make a diﬀerence, i.e. his a posteriori power. Second, if this is of normative
interest or a necessity for lack of precise data, calculate a priori power as expected a
posteriori power. Expectation can be with respect to several diﬀerent aspects of a posteriori
power such as actions, preferences, or procedure. This allows the (re-)foundation of a priori
measures on a well-speciﬁed notion of a posteriori power.
There are many – to us, at this stage, all promising – directions in which the notion of
‘power as marginal impact’ can be made precise. The uniting theme is the identiﬁcation
of the potential to inﬂuence an outcome of group decision making. Inﬂuence can equally
refer to the impact of a random ‘yes’ or ‘no’-decision, as assumed by the traditional proba-
bilistic index approach, and to the impact of a strategic ‘yes’ or ’no’-vote based on explicit
preferences.
Crucially, ‘impact’ is always relative to a what-if scenario or what we would like to
call the shadow outcome. The shadow outcome is the group’s decision which would have
resulted if the player whose power is under consideration had chosen diﬀerently than he a
posteriori did, e.g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when he a posteriori belongs to it,
or had ideal point 0 instead of 1. While in simple games the diﬀerence between shadow
outcome and actual outcome is either 0 or 1, a richer decision framework allows for more
ﬁnely graded a posteriori power. It also requires a choice between several candidates for
the ‘right’ shadow outcome and, possibly, the subjective evaluation of diﬀerences.
A natural way to proceed in general is to measure player i’s power as the diﬀerence















i, i.e. the case
in which – for whatever reasons – player i chooses a diﬀerent action. For preference-based
actions with a unique equilibrium a¤, this deﬁnes a player’s a posteriori power as the
hypothetical impact of a tremble in the sense of Selten’s (1975) perfectness concept, i.e. of
irrational behaviour or imperfect implementation of his preferred action. More generally,
a tremble can refer to just any deviation from reference behaviour or reference preferences.
If Ai consists of more than two elements, diﬀerent degrees of irrationality or – if pref-
erences are left out of the picture – potential deviations from the observed action proﬁle
can be considered. In particular, one may conﬁne attention to the impact of a local action
tremble. If Ai = X = f0;±;2±;:::;1g for some ± > 0 that uniformly divides [0;1], a














i ¡ ± > 0
0; otherwise.
(4)
If ± = 1, this corresponds exactly to D0
i(¢) and the marginal contribution deﬁned in the
traditional power index framework. As players’ choice set approaches the unit interval, i.e.























Both (4) and (5) measure player i’s power in a given situation, described a posteriori
by action vector a¤, as the (marginal) change of outcome which would be caused by a small
(or marginal) change of i’s action. It is, however, not necessary to take only small trembles
















to deﬁne an alternative measure of a posteriori power.22
17Players’ preferences may enter (4)–(6) to deﬁne x¤(¸1;:::;¸n) ´ x(a¤) as the reference
point for action trembles, i.e. the point at which the derivative of outcome function x(¢)
w.r.t. player i’s action is evaluated. If x¤(¸1;:::;¸n) is the unique equilibrium outcome,
any action deviation resulting in a distinct outcome is irrational. A meaningful alternative
to studying the potential damage or good that a player’s irrationality could cause is to
instead consider the eﬀect of variations in his preferences while maintaining rationality.
This refers to the following two criteria for power:
² If a player wanted to, could he alter the outcome of collective decision making?
² Would the change of outcome in magnitude (and direction) match the considered
change in preference?
As in the case of hypothetical action changes, one may consider either any conceivable
change of preferences relative to some reference point or restrict attention to slight varia-
tions. The latter requires some metric on preferences. It is, however, naturally given for
Euclidean preferences.
For illustration, consider players N = f1;2;3g with Euclidean preferences on policy
space X = [0;1], described by individual ideal points ¸i 2 X, and simple majority voting
on proposals made by the players. Let ¸(j) denote the j-th smallest of players’ ideal points,
i.e. ¸(1) · ¸(2) · ¸(3). Depending on the precise assumptions on the order of making
proposals and voting, many equilibrium proﬁles of player strategies exist. However, they
yield the median voter’s ideal point, ¸(2), as the unique equilibrium outcome x¤(¸1;¸2;¸3).
One can then investigate player 1’s power for given ¸2 and ¸3, where without loss of
22The total range Dmax
i := maxa¡i2Xn¡1[maxai2X x(ai;a¡i) ¡ minai2X x(ai;a¡i)] of player i’s pos-
sible impact on outcome lacks any a posteriori character. It seems a reasonable a priori measure
which requires no distribution assumptions on ˜ a¤ or ˜ ¸. However, it is a rather coarse concept and




¡i) := maxai2X x(ai;a¤
¡i) ¡ minai2X x(ai;a¤
¡i) holds an intermediate ground.





Figure 1: Equilibrium outcome of simple majority voting as ¸1 is varied
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is a measure of player 1’s power as a function of players’ ideal points in X. According to
D2
i(¢), player 1 is powerless (in the sense of not being able to inﬂuence collective choice
although he would like to do so after a small change of preference) if he is not the median
voter. For ¸1 2 (¸2;¸3), he has maximal power in the sense that any (small) change in
individual preference shifts the collective decision by exactly the desired amount.
So far, we have only considered ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space X. Both
the derivation of a posteriori power and a possible formation of expectations will typically
19be more complicated for higher-dimensional spaces.However, this is no obstacle to our
two-step power analysis in principle.
To illustrate this, let Λ = (¸1;:::;¸n) be the collection of n players’ ideal points in Rm
(an m £ n matrix having as columns the ¸i-vectors representing individual players’ ideal
points). In a policy space X µ Rm, the opportunities even for only marginal changes of
preference are manifold. A given ideal point ¸i can locally be shifted to ¸i + h where h
is an arbitrary vector in Rm with small norm. Which tremble directions it is reasonable
to consider in applications will depend.23 Multiples of the vector (1;1;:::;1) 2 Rm seem
reasonable if the m policy dimensions are independent of each other.
In any case, if the vector h that describes the direction of preference trembles has norm
khk and so ® = (®1;:::;®m) = h











as a reasonable measure of player i’s a posteriori power provided that above limit exists.
This is simply the directional derivative of the equilibrium outcome in the direction h or ®.
Other measures for the multidimensional case can be based on the gradient of x¤(¸i;¸¡i)
(holding ¸¡i constant). In case of ideal points in a discrete policy space, a preference-based
measure D20
i (¸) can be deﬁned by replacing the derivative in (7) with a diﬀerence quotient
in analogy to (4) and (5). Another candidate for a meaningful a priori measure of player 1’s












This is based on the consideration not only of small preference modiﬁcations but also of a
complete relocation of the player’s ideal outcome (see also fn. 22).
23One may also consider not a particular direction h but rather an entire neighbourhood of ¸i. This
could be accomplished by taking the supremum of (7) for all possible directions ®.
205.3 Calculating A Priori Power
Mappings D1
i, D2
i, and their discrete versions measure a posteriori power as the diﬀerence
between distinct shadow outcomes and the observed equilibrium collective decision. We
do not want to discuss at this point which is the most relevant shadow outcome and hence
measure.24 But let us stress that though these indices measure diﬀerent types of power as
determined by players’ preferences and the decision procedure, they do not mix it up with
the luck of a satisfying group decision as e.g. Steunenberg et al.’s proposal.
Having selected a meaningful measure of a posteriori power, it is straightforward to
deﬁne a meaningful a priori measure. It has to be based on explicit informational assump-
tions concerning players’ preferences or – if one does not want to assume preference-driven
behaviour – actions. Denoting by ˜ » the random state of the world as given either by






is the a priori power index based on a posteriori measure Di(¢) and decision procedure or
game form Γ.25
Traditional power indices, such as the Penrose or Shapley-Shubik index, consider the
particularly simple decision procedure in which players i 2 N = f1;:::;ng choose an action
ai 2 Ai = f0;1g and the outcome of decision making, x(a), is 1 if set Y := fij¸i = 1g
is a winning coalition, i.e. if v(Y ) = 1, and 0 otherwise. They use D0
i(a) (or D1
i(a) with
± = 1). The StPI proposed by Steunenberg et al., too, is a linear transform of (9), albeit
using the unreasonable a posteriori power measure Di(˜ ») =
°
°




Let us illustrate our aprioristic approach to measuring power more explicitly. As an
24Note that D1
00
i (a¤) and D2
00
i (¸) produce identical power indications if each action can be a player’s
most preferred one.
25We have omitted a sub- or superscript Γ in the deﬁnition of a posteriori measures for a concise notation.
The procedure is, however, the central determinant of outcome functions x(¢) or x¤(¢). If several diﬀerent
game forms Γ 2 G are to be considered a priori, one has to take expectation over ¹Γ
i with the appropriate
probability measure on G.
21example assume a simple procedural spatial voting game where a ﬁxed agenda setter makes
a ‘take it or leave it’ oﬀer to a group of 5 voters and needs 4 sequentially cast votes to pass
it. The policy space is X = [0;1], voters’ ideal points are ¸1;:::;¸5, that of the agenda
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2¾ ^ ¸i = ¸(2)
0; otherwise.
Based on this, one can derive aprioristic strategic power measures ¹Γ
j and ¹Γ
i for the
















where f¾ and f¸(2) are the densities of the independent random variables ¾ and ¸(2), re-







































22which is the product of the probability 0.075 of player i having a swing that matters to
the outcome and a posteriori power D2
i(¾;¸) = 2 for these preference conﬁgurations. This
means that ex ante a shift of the agenda setter’s ideal point ¾ (voter i’s ideal point ¸i) by
one marginal unit will induce an expected shift of the outcome by 0.625 units (0.15 units).
So the agenda setter’s leverage on the outcome is ex ante more than four times larger than
that of any given voter. One may want to compare agenda setting power to the power of
the complete council consisting of all ﬁve voters. This can be done by ascribing the ideal












2f¾(x)f¸(2)(y)dy dx = 0:75;
i.e. the council-of-ﬁve has a priori slightly more power in aggregate than the agenda setter.
6 Concluding Remarks
The uniform distribution of players’ ideal points assumed in the previous section is conve-
nient because its order statistics (the distribution e.g. ¸(2)) are easy to calculate. However,
any other distribution can be studied if there are reasons to do so. Similarly, the decision
procedure Γ need not be as simple as in above examples.
For more complex, possibly more realistic assumptions about preferences and proce-
dures, the proposed two-step approach to a priori measurement of power remains valid.
The only diﬀerence to our simple illustrations is that the calculations – i.e. determination
of the equilibrium outcome as a function of preferences, its derivatives w.r.t. to players’
ideal points, and aggregation via integration – will be more complicated. This is not a real
problem if one does not insist on closed analytical solutions, but is primarily concerned
with numerical values. In particular, Monte Carlo simulation even of complicated vot-
ing bodies is possible on a conventional desktop PC. It allows to approximate the desired
probabilities and expectations with arbitrary precision.
We have deﬁned a posteriori power as the objective marginal impact which a player’s
action or underlying preference has had on the outcome of collective decision making. It
23is possible to go one step further. Namely, we have in passing hinted at the opportunity
to understand – and measure – power as a subjective concept.
Consider a multi-dimensional policy space. Let the decision procedure give player i
dictator power in some dimension di. The opportunity to deﬁne the collective decision in
this dimension can be all that player i cares for. Judged in terms of his own preferences
he has maximal power. The other players may be completely indiﬀerent towards their
joint decision’s component in dimension di. Judged in terms of their preferences, i is a
dummy who can never have an impact on their well-being. Alternatively, player i can hold
dictator power on a dimension he does not care about (e.g. to pardon an unknown convict
sentenced to death), but which is all-important to some, perhaps not all, other players.
Player i is powerful depending on one’s view-point, i.e. preferences.
Given the often very personal judgement of power in real life, it seems worthwhile to
study the subjective marginal impact of players’ actions or preferences. It is straightforward
to replace the derivative of outcome function x¤(¢) in above deﬁnitions by the derivative
of players’ utility of outcome, ui(x¤(¢)), taken with respect to their own and other players’
actions or parameterized preferences. A player’s power is then not simply a real num-
ber, but a vector of subjective evaluations of it by all players (including himself). The
corresponding index function is matrix-valued.
Subjective evaluation of players’ power may be meaningless in the context of normative
analysis of constitutional designs. However, it seems relevant for positive analysis, and is
arguably the most relevant aspect to participants when decision procedures, e.g. in the
EU or the WTO, are the object of multilateral negotiations.
Scholars of equilibrium-based a posteriori power and those favouring axiomatic a priori
analysis will probably not see an urgent need to merge their ﬁelds. But our uniﬁed approach
hopefully clariﬁes that they are not as far apart as it may seem. The axiomatic camp
has been very little concerned with the notion of a posteriori power which is implicitly
underlying their indices. Its members have jumped rather directly from an abstractly
deﬁned voting body to individual power values – without specifying how agents can and
do act and investigating what intermediate a posteriori power is associated with this. The
24non-cooperative camp has been interested only in the initial step of looking at equilibrium
behaviour and its consequences for individual success. If the latter’s attention is extended
from success to power, which is in case of subjective evaluation the derivative of success,
and if the former’s large jump is decomposed into two smaller steps, both methodological
approaches turn out to considerably complement each other.
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